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1  Introduction 
 
The National Credit Regulator
1 approached the then Transvaal Provincial Division of 
the High Court (TPD) in 2008 by way of a notice of motion.  The Regulator prayed in 
terms of Section 16(1)(b) of the National Credit Act
2 for the proper interpretation of 
certain sections of the same Act.  Those sections related mainly to the practice of 
debt review, and more particularly the role of a magistrate when hearing a proposal 
referred to the Magistrate's Court by a debt counsellor.
3 
 
The implementation of debt review mechanisms provided for in  Sections 86 and 87 
of the NCA led to conflicting views, as expressed by debt counsellors, the Regulator, 
the major banks and   magistrates.    Uncertainty and confusion  with regard  to  the 
proper  interpretation  of these two sections of the   NCA  followed.
4    Contradictory 
decisions given by magistrates also hindered the effective application of the NCA as 
regards  debt  restructuring.
5  It  was  even  possible  that  there  were  serious 
shortcomings  in  the  NCA  itself ,  which  should  be  addressed  by  appropriate 
amendments of the Act.
6 
 
The Regulator  therefore  lodged  an  application to  obtain  clarity  on  some  of the 
difficulties that debt counsellors experience in practice.
7  The matter was heard in the 
                                                 
*  Dawid  de  Villiers  MA  (Stell)  LLB  DTh  (UNISA)  MCom  (Pret).  Attorney  and  debt  counsellor, 
University of Pretoria Law Clinic, University of Pretoria. 
1  Established under section 12 of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005.  
2    34 of 2005 (hereafter NCA). 
3    Applicant’s heads of argument to the National Credit Regulator’s application for a declaratory 
order in terms of S 16 of the NCA, National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd 2009 6 SA 295 
(GNP) (hereafter Heads) para 2. 
4   Heads para 17. 
5   Founding affidavit in the notice of motion, National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd 2009 6 SA 
295 (GNP) (hereafter Founding affidavit) 7. 
6    Founding affidavit 7. 
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TPD  on  2  March  2009  and  judgment  was  handed  down  by  Du  Plessis  J  on  21 
August 2009.
8  
 
2  Critical analysis of the declaratory order 
 
The Regulator sought fifteen declaratory orders.
9  The first nine  prayers related to 
the role of a magistrate hearing matters referred to him under Sections 86 and 87 of 
the NCA and the applicability of the  Magistrate's Courts Act
10 and its Rules.  The 
tenth  to  fifteenth  prayers  dealt  with  a  number  of  practical  issues  and  other 
interpretive  difficulties  that  are,  strictly  speaking,  not  dependent  on  a  finding 
regarding the role or power of a magistrate and the applicability of the MCA and its 
Rules.
11 
 
This article analyses the prayers and the resulting orders critically in three sections 
for the sake of expediency, namely: 
  those prayers that deal with the NCA and the Magistrate's Court; 
  those  prayers  that  deal  with  the  role  of  the  debt  counsellor  in  debt 
restructuring; and 
  those prayers that deal with the  application procedure to the Magistrate's 
Court.  
 
2.1  Sections 86 and 87 of the NCA and the Magistrate's Court 
 
Although these prayers concern mostly civil procedure and do not impact directly on 
the debt counsellor's business as such, they involve the support structure without 
which no debt restructuring can be viable.   
 
2.1.1   Procedure after a Section 86(7)(c) finding 
 
Section 86 is silent on the procedure a debt counsellor should follow after he/she has 
'issued'  a  proposal  recommending  that  the  Magistrate's  Court  make  orders  as 
                                                 
8    Declarator 295. 
9   Heads para 30. 
10   32 of 1944 (hereafter MCA). 
11   Heads para 32. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
  130/204 
contemplated in Sections 86(7)(c)(i) and (ii).  The applicant submitted that although 
Section  86(8)  does  not  refer  to  the  procedure  to  be  followed  when  a 
recommendation  in  terms  of  Section  86(7)(c)  is  made,
12  Section  86(8)(b) should 
apply in such a case, and that the debt counsellor should refer the recommendation 
to the Magistrate's Court for a hearing under  Section  87.
13    Order  1  in terms of 
Prayer 15 was granted, thereby closing a hiatus in the NCA’s formulation of Section 
86(8): 
 
On a proper interpretation of section 86(8)(b), it applies in the circumstances 
contemplated in section 86(7)(c).  
 
The  first  to  sixth  respondents  submitted  that  the  provisions  of  Section  86(8)(a) 
should also apply to cases in which the consumer was found to be over-indebted.  
The Court points out that a finding of over-indebtedness in terms of Section 86(7)(c) 
sets  in motion  a  debt  re-arrangement  process  that  is not  voluntary.
14  Should the 
parties settle the matter and agree on a re-arrangement plan, nothing prevents them 
from seeking a consent order.  However, for settlement negotiations to take place, 
Section 86(8)(a) is not explicitly required. 
 
In light of the spirit of the Act that all parties participate in good faith,
15 it is submitted 
that credit providers' response to  debt-restructuring proposals in terms of  Section 
86(7)(c)  should be requested prior to applying to court for an order in terms of 
Section 87.  If the proposal is accepted by the credit providers , a consent order by 
the Magistrate's Court  can  be obtained.    In  Haupt,  Roestoff and Erasmus,
16  it is 
proposed contra curiam that Section 86(8)(a) be amended to provide for this option 
and to clarify any uncertainty in this regard.  
 
Regulation 3 of the Draft Debt Counselling Regulations
17 addresses the same issue 
pertaining to the procedure when a proposal in terms of Section 86(7)(c) is referred 
                                                 
12   S 86(8) only pertains to a recommendation in terms of Section 86(7)(b), while S 86(9) pertains to 
the procedure initiated when the debt counsellor rejects the debt review application in terms of 
S 86(7)(a). 
13   Scholtz et al Guide para 14–17. 
14   Declarator 305. 
15  See S 86(4). 
16  www.ncr.org.za 95. 
17   GN R503 in GG 32229 of 15 May 2009. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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to court.  Regulation 3 provides that the debt counsellor must lodge the proposal 
through  Form B,  which  must  be  filed  as  soon  as  it  has  been  delivered  to  the 
consumer and credit providers.  Such a proposal must be substantiated by a written 
statement, which must contain the information set out in Sub-regulation 2.  The credit 
providers affected must be informed that they may oppose the proposal by filing a 
notice
18 through Form C with the clerk of the  court and deliver a copy to the debt 
counsellor.
19 
 
While  the  Draft  Regulations  give  more  clarity,  Roestoff  et  al
20  submit  that  an 
amended Section 86(8) should allow for a contested recommendation to be made in 
terms of Section 86(7)(c) and alternatively a consent order to be obtained, should all 
credit providers agree to a restructuring proposal in terms of Section 86(7)(c).  The 
new Section 86(8) should add Subsection (7)(c) as an option to Subsection (7)(b). 
 
The above change affects findings made in terms of Sections 86(7)(b) and 86(7)(c).  
In  both  cases,  it  would  then  be  possible  to  acquire  either  a  consent  order  or  a 
restructuring order when the proposal is contested. 
 
2.1.2  Judicial or administrative role of the Magistrate's Court 
 
In Prayer 4 of its notice of motion,
21 the Regulator sought an order declaring that in 
the discharge of his/her duties under Section 87 of the NCA, the relevant magistrate 
fulfils an administrative role as opposed to a judicial role.  Consequently he/she must 
comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
22 
and  the  Promotion  of  Administrative  Justice  Act,
23  and must devise appropriate 
procedures that would facilitate an inexpensive, fair and expeditious hearing in terms 
of Section 87 of the NCA.
24 The respondents contended on the other hand that a 
magistrate fulfilled a judicial and not an administrative role.
25 
                                                 
18   Draft Regulation 3(4) stipulates the required content and  the manner in  which and when the 
notice must be delivered. 
19   Roestoff et al 2009 PER 274. 
20   Roestoff et al 291. 
21   Notice of motion 3. 
22  Hereafter Constitution. 
23  3 of 2000. 
24   Heads para 42; Scholtz et al para 11–28. 
25   Heads para 43. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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The  Court  points  out  that  a  magistrate  dealing  with  a  matter  referred  to  the 
Magistrate's  Court  is  called  upon  to  make  a  number  of  possible  findings  on 
contentious matters.
26 The magistrate must decide whether to accept or reject the 
debt counsellor's recommendation with respect to the consumer's application.
  
If it is 
found  that  the  consumer  is  over-indebted,  the  magistrate  will  have  to  consider 
whether  the  consumer's  obligations  must  be  re-arranged.    With  regard  to  the 
provisions of Section 86(7)(c)(ii), the magistrate will then also have to consider the 
manner in which the re-arrangement is to be structured.
27 
 
Each of the findings mentioned involves a consideration of the relevant evidence, the 
making of factual findings, a consideration of the relevant statutory and other legal 
provisions, rules and principles and, finally an application of the law to the facts.
28  In 
most cases, the findings will aim to resolve one or more disputes between two or 
more parties.   The essential elements of a judicial function  are resolving disputes 
and  generally  mak ing  findings  based  on  the  applicatio n  of  law  to  the  facts .
29  
Accordingly, the Court found that in discharging his/her duties under  Section 87 of 
the Act the relevant magistrate fulfilled a judicial role .   Prayer 4  was accordingly 
dismissed.
30  
 
In light of other orders granted by the Declarator, this decision makes sense.  The 
applicant's  reasons  for  requesting  a  more  administrative  procedure  were  clear, 
namely speed, simplicity and costs .   However,  the Court arguments were also 
convincing that the function of the magistrate is more judicial i n nature and not only 
administrative.    Apparently,  there is  no precedent for the so-called administrative 
hearing procedure in the Magistrate 's Court,  and the statute does not allow the 
flexibility to 'create' such a sui generis process.
31  It is submitted that another body, 
for example a tribunal, should be used  for this purpose.  It is common knowledge 
that the National Consumer Tribunal can also issue consent orders.
32 
 
                                                 
26   Declarator 306. 
27   Declarator 306. 
28   Declarator 306. 
29   Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Pension Fund Adjudicator 2007 3 SA 458 (C) para 12.  
30   Declarator 306. 
31  Declarator 307. 
32   NCA S 27(a)(i). DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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2.1.3   The NCA and the powers of the Magistrate's Court 
 
In Prayer 3 of its notice of motion,
33 the Regulator submits that the magistrate to 
whom a recommendation has been referred by a debt counsellor derives his /her 
power from the NCA and not from the MCA.  
 
The Court
34 contended that Prayers 1 and 3 address the same essential issue of the 
procedure to be followed when a matter is referred to the Magistrate 's Court under 
Sections 86 and 87.   The respondents argued that the Rules of the Magistrate 's 
Courts be followed and sought a different declaratory order.
35  The applicant, on the 
other hand, contended that the  MCA  and the Rules do not apply.  The narrow 
question that Prayer 3 raises is:  from which act does the Magistrate's Court derive 
its relevant powers?
36  
 
The proposition can be made that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Courts must be 
deduced from an Act of Parliament.  The powers under discussion are derived from 
the Act.   This, according to the Court,  is confirmed by  Section 29(1) of the  MCA, 
which provides that "subject to the provisions of this Act and the National Credit Act 
2005, the court, in respect of causes of action, shall have jurisdiction ” in a variety of 
matters that are listed in the section.
37  
 
However, the conclusion that the powers are  partly derived from the NCA does not 
entitle the applicant to the order it seeks, the Court pointed out.  The prayer does not 
address the dispute between the parties, that is, whether the  MCA and the Rules 
apply to matters referred to the Magistrate's Court under Sections 86 and 87.
38 The 
real issue is apparent from the first to sixth re spondents' counter-application.
39 The 
question remains whether the MCA and the Rules  do apply to referrals in terms of 
Section 86.
40  
                                                 
33   Notice of Motion 2. 
34   Declarator 307. 
35   Declarator 307. 
36   Declarator 307. 
37   Declarator 308. 
38   Declarator 308. 
39   Declarator 308. 
40   Declarator 308. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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The Court conceded that the referral of a matter to the Magistrate's Court under 
Section 86(8)(b), in particular, constitutes an extraordinary procedure created by the 
Act.
41 The procedure is out of the ordinary because it concerns a  lis or suit between 
the consumer and his/her credit providers, but the initiative to refer it to court is taken 
by  a  third  party,  the  debt  counsellor  who  acts  as  pro  forma  applicant.
42  The 
procedure concerns a suit because by applying to be declared over -indebted the 
consumer is seeking at least a re-arrangement of one or more of his/her obligations.  
That entails, or may entail, a failure to comply w ith the terms of agreements with 
credit providers.  
 
The fact that the procedure is out of the ordinary does not necessarily imply that the 
MCA and the Rules do not apply here.
43  These Rules prescribe the manner in which 
matters are brought before court and the manner in which the Court then deals with 
them.  It is assumed that Parliament by way of legislation may prescribe procedures 
that differ from the  Rules.   However, if there is no such prescription, the relevant 
Rules of the Magistrate's Court must be followed.
44  
 
The consumer's initial application for debt review must be in a form prescribed by the 
present Regulation 24.  A consumer who applies directly to the Magistrate 's Court 
under Section 86(9) must also do so in the prescribed manner and  by Form 18.
45  
Section 86(8)(b) obliges a debt counsellor to refer certain matters to the Magistrate's 
Court, but does not prescribe any procedure.  It follows that in such cases the MCA 
and the Rules apply.
46 In the result the Court made an Order 3 in accordance with 
Prayer 3 of the first to sixth respondents' counter-application: 
 
The power of a Magistrate's Court to conduct a hearing in terms of section 
87 of the National Credit Act, 2005 and to make appropriate orders in 
consequence thereof is derived from section 87 read with section 86 of the 
said  Act,  and  the  Magistrate 's  Courts  Act,  1944  and  the  Rules  of  the 
Magistrate's Courts govern the procedure by which it may conduct itself in so 
doing.  
 
                                                 
41   Declarator 309. 
42   Declarator 309. 
43  Declarator 309. 
44   Declarator 310. 
45  Reg 26. 
46   Reg 26. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
  135/204 
This order is to be  understood  in  light  of  the  dismissal  of  Prayer  4  above.  It  is 
obvious  that  the  Court,  after  declining  the  call  for  an  administrative  hearing 
procedure, now has to explain which procedure should in fact be used.  The Court's 
argument is that the MCA and its Rules are the basis for any proceedings, although 
the NCA also has to be taken into account.  Since the Magistrate's Court has no 
inherent  discretion  to  vary  and  adapt,  the  incumbent  and  well-known  procedures 
have  to  be  applied.    The  process  can  still  be  called  a  "hearing",  but  has  to  be 
confined within the statute and provision of the Rules. 
 
2.1.4   A referral is not an application 
 
In Prayer 1 of its notice of motion,
47 the Regulator sought an order declaring that a 
referral of a recommendation by a debt counsellor to a Magistrate's Court in terms of 
Section 86(8)(b) of the NCA does not constitute an application for the purposes of 
the MCA or the Rules.  This is another strategy furnished by the Regulator to stay 
clear of the cumbersome and, in their opinion, the purpose -defeating application 
procedure.  
 
The applicant argued that  Section 86(8)(b) of the NCA does not explicitly require a 
debt counsellor to make an application to a Magistrate's Court.
48 A debt counsellor is 
authorised under Section 86(7)(c) of the NCA to issue a proposal recommending that 
a  Magistrate's  Court make either or both of certain defined   orders.   In terms of 
Section  86(8)(b)  of  the  NCA,  a  debt  counsellor  must  refer  the  matter  to  the 
Magistrate's  Court  with  his/her  recommendation.    Section  86(8)(b)  makes  no 
reference to an applic ation, but  mentions  a referral.   By contrast,  Section  86(9) 
permits a consumer whose application to a debt counsellor has been rejected by 
such debt counsellor to  apply to a Magistrate's Court for an order contemplated in 
Section 86(7)(c) of the NCA.  The legislature has drawn a distinction between the 
words  "application"  and  "recommendation"  in  a  number  of  sections,  including 
Sections 87(1)(a) and 88(1)(b). 
 
                                                 
47   Notice of notion 2. 
48   Heads para 36. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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It follows, according to the applicant,
49 that if the referral by a debt counsellor of 
his/her  recommendation  to  a  Magistrate's  Court  is  not  an  application  for  the 
purposes of the MCA, such referral does not need to comply with the MCA or its 
Rules, more particularly, with Rule 55.  The Court did not entertain the applicant's 
arguments
50 and made the following Order 4: 
 
A referral by a debt counsellor to a Magistrate's Court under section 86(8)(b) 
and section 86(7)(c) of the National Credit Act, 2005 is an application within 
the meaning of the  Magistrate's  Courts Act, 1944 and the Rules of the 
Magistrate's Courts and falls to be treated as such in terms of Rule 55 of the 
Rules.  
 
It is submitted that no alternative sui generis method was put in place by the NCA.  
This order enhances Order 3 above and implies that for the moment the Magistrate's 
Court  can  only  be  approached  in  terms  of  Sections  86  and  87  by  utilising  the 
application procedure, already set out by Rule 55 of the Court.
51  Credit providers are 
to  be cited as respondents ,  who  in their turn  can reply per affidavit   to the relief 
sought against them.
52 
 
Draft Regulations 4(9) and 4(10), if indeed applicable in respect of referrals in terms 
of Section 86(7)(c), address the issue of the Act being silent on the procedure to be 
employed in court when a 'hearing' takes place.
53 Draft Regulation 4(9) reads: 
 
(9)  A hearing contemplated in sub regulation (8) shall be administrative in 
nature and shall be conducted expeditiously in accordance with section 
33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
It is obvious that the stipulations of the  Draft Regulations are in direct contrast with 
Court Orders 4 and 3.
54  The regulations, relying on just administration in terms of 
Section  33(1) of the  Constitution,  attempt  to  keep  the  hearing  administrative  in 
                                                 
49   Heads para 37. 
50   Declarator 310. 
51   Roestoff et al 277. 
52  Da Silva et al www.ncr.org.za 49. 
53   Draft Regulations 4(9) and 4(10). 
54   See above and section 2.1.3. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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nature and not judicial.  Section 33(1) provides as follows:
55 "Everyone has the right 
to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair." 
 
Administrative action is preferred in the Draft Regulations, since it tends to be faster, 
easier and less costly.  Some factors do benefit the process and especially support 
the  already  exhausted  customer .    So,  for  example,  no  legal  representation  is 
needed, questions may be asked  of the parties by the presiding officer, costs are 
minimal, no cross-examination can take place and a determination must be made in 
thirty days.
56  
 
This discrepancy may cause a major confusion in legal practice.  It is submitted that 
the Rules Board should  attempt  to  develop  a  sui  generis  procedure  for  matters 
referred to the Magistrate's Court in terms of Sections 86 and 87 of the NCA, which 
is less cumbersome than the one prescribed in Rule 55.  
 
According  to  Loots,
57  the Rules Board  is  proposing  changes  to  the  Rules  of the 
Magistrate's  Courts.  A  new  sub -rule  has  been  devised  that  will  indicate  the 
documentation  that  should  be included in the application.  Since the declaratory 
order emphasised the principle of  judicial oversight of  all debt arrangements, the 
amended  Rules  will  require  a  magistrate  to  decide  on  any  orders  for  default 
judgment in terms of Section 58 of the MCA and even for judgment by consent.  The 
clerk of the court will then not be entitled to issue these orders on his/her own. 
 
2.1.5   Powers of the Magistrate's Court  
 
In Prayer 2 of its notice of motion,
58 the Regulator sought an order declaring that the 
debt  counsellor  "must",  in  terms  of  Section  86(8)(b),  refer  the  matter  to  the 
Magistrate's Court, should the parties have been unable to agree on a voluntary re-
arrangement.  The same reasons for granting Order 1 above apply should the debt 
                                                 
55   Constitution S 33(1). 
56   Draft Regulations 4(10).  
57   "Proposed changes". 
58   Notice of motion 2. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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counsellor find that the consumer is over-indebted.  The Magistrate's Court must 
conduct a hearing, the Court affirmed.
59  
 
Section 87(1) provides that the Magistrate 's Court "may" either in terms of Section 
87(1)(a) reject the recommendation/application or in terms of Section 87(1)(b) grant 
the orders mentioned, the Court elucidated.
60 These orders are the only ones that 
the Magistrate's Court can make.  The reason for this is that the Magistrate's Court 
may only decide on matters "determined by an Act of Parliament".  Put differently, a 
Magistrate's  Court  only  has  those  powers  that  were  conferred  by  an  Act  of 
Parliament.
61 
 
 
It is noted that the relief granted with regard to Prayer 2 does not address the form 
that the hearing must take or the procedure that the Magistrate's Court must adopt.  
This aspect has been also dealt with by the Court in Orders 3 and 4 above.
62 An 
Order 2 in terms of Prayer 2 was granted as follows: 
 
In circumstances where section 86(8)(b) of the Act applies, a debt counsellor 
is obliged to refer his or her recommendation to a Magistrate's Court and the 
magistrate to whom the matter is allocated is in terms of section 87 obliged 
to  conduct  a  hearing  and  make  an  order  contemplated  in  either  section 
87(1)(a) or section 87(1)(b) of the National Credit Act, 2005.   
 
The rationale for Prayer 2 is not clear; it appears to state the obvious.  Sections 86 
and 87 of the NCA are not ambiguous.  Perhaps some confusion in debt review 
practice is addressed by this order.  Notably, however, the Court
63 does not shy 
away from using the word "hearing", which is typical of the NCA's vocabulary. 
 
2.1.6   Remarks 
 
The orders discussed above confirmed the application of the MCA and its Rules to 
debt review.  Since there is at present no sui generis procedure provided for in the 
NCA, it is submitted that the Court's approach is correct.  However, the result is that 
                                                 
59   Declarator 307. 
60  Declarator 307.  
61   Declarator 307. 
62   See the discussion in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 above. 
63   Declarator 307. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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the over-indebted consumer is not supported to the degree the NCA would set out to 
attain.
64  A  Rule  55  procedure  can  be  cumbersome  and  costly,  while  the  NCA 
envisaged a fast and relatively inexpensive process.  
 
2.2  The debt counsellor and the Court 
 
This group of prayers deals specifically with the unique role of the debt counsellor 
with regard to debt review proceedings before the Court.  
 
2.2.1   Role of the debt counsellor 
 
In Prayer 7 of its notice of motion,
65 the Regulator seeks an order declaring that a 
debt counsellor who refers a proposal to a Magistrate 's Court in terms of  Section 
86(8)(b) is entitled to adduce evidence and  present arguments in support of his/her 
recommendation in any hearing under  Section  87.    The Regulator submits that 
Section 87 of the NCA implies an informal inquisitorial hearing, rather than a formal 
adversarial one.  In other words, a magistrate should initiate, direct and control the 
proceedings,  thereby  permitting  the  debt  counsellor  to  adduce  evidence  and 
advance arguments in support of  his/her recommendation.
66  All parties  agreed in 
principle that a debt counsellor should be entitled  at a hearing  to furnish evidence 
before a magistrate to explain his/her recommendation.
67 This is consistent with the 
spirit and object of the NCA and it is always desirable in order to assist a magistrate 
in determining which orders he/she ought to grant.
68 
 
In this regard the Court found that the debt counsellor's role in terms of Section 86 is 
that of a neutral functionary who does not advance any particular party 's cause.
69 
The respondents sought an order that reflects the debt counsellor's role more clearly.  
The Court pointed out that t here is  no reason  that the debt counsellor  could not 
make submissions regarding  his/her proposal.
70 In view of  his/her investigation in 
                                                 
64   NCA S 3. 
65   Notice of motion 3.  
66   Heads para 85. 
67   Heads para 90. 
68   Heads para 90. 
69   Declarator 313. 
70   Declarator 313. DW DE VILLIERS                               PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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terms of Section 86, the debt counsellor will know the relevant facts and submissions 
necessary to explain the proposal and to assist the Court.  Accordingly, the Court 
granted Order 8 as follows:
71 
 
A debt counsellor who refers a matter to the Magistrate 's Court in terms of 
sections 86(7)(c) and 86(8)(b) of the National Credit Act, 2005 has a duty to 
assist the court and should be available and able to render such assistance 
by  way  of furnishing  evidence  or making  submissions  as to his  or her 
proposal or to answer any queries raised by the Court.  
 
This order  brings  significant  clarity  with  regard  to  the  role  of  the  debt  counsellor 
during court proceedings.  The debt counsellor has a duty to assist the Court.  This 
implies that he/she should be available to appear, able to give evidence or make 
submissions, and answer any queries raised by the Court.  In practice, this would 
apparently not be a normal application procedure, as it would not be possible for the 
Court  to  proceed  when  only  the  attorney  for  the  applicant  is  present.    The  debt 
counsellor must be present or on stand by.  The question is:  could a debt counsellor 
solely appear as the applicant or is an attorney always needed?  This is not common 
in court proceedings, but certainly possible with some experience on the part of the 
debt counsellor.   
 
2.2.2  Powers of the debt counsellor in terms of Section 86(8) 
 
In Prayer 14 of its notice of motion,
72 the Regulator seeks a declaratory order that a 
failure to conclude negotiations arising from a proposal or counter-proposal made by 
a credit provider in response to a recommendation or proposal by a debt counsellor 
in terms of  Sections 86(7)(a) or 86(7)(b) of the NCA does not preclude such debt 
counsellor from exercising  his/her powers under  Section 86(8).  In support  of this 
prayer, the Regulator submitted that the objectives of the NCA would be defeated 
should  a  debt  co unsellor  be  obliged  to  eng age  in  endless  negotiations  and 
discussions with a credit provider before he/she can refer his/her recommendation to 
a magistrate.
73 
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The  first  to  sixth  respondents,  on  the  other  hand,  adopted  the  view  that  a  debt 
counsellor is not entitled to refer his/her recommendation to a magistrate, unless and 
until he/she reasonably concludes that the negotiations between a credit provider 
and the consumer are not in good faith, were terminated or are unlikely to result in a 
responsible debt arrangement.
74  
 
The Court  pointed out that the Act provides for negotiations  if a consumer is not 
over-indebted, but experiences or is likely to experience difficulty to satisfy all his or 
her  obligations  in  time.
75    Nothing  however  prevents  the  debt  counsellor,  the 
consumer and credit providers from entering into negotiations in the case of an over-
indebted consumer whose matter has been referred to the  Court.  However, such 
negotiations are not prescribed by the Act.  These are settlement negotiations.
76 
 
Whether the parties have agreed to a voluntary re-arrangement is a fact that has to 
be ascertained in each case.  However, according to the Court,  a debt counsellor 
may only refer a case of attempted voluntary debt re -arrangement to the  Court, 
should he/she be satisfied that no agreement will be reached, either because a party 
has  rejected  the  proposed  re -arrangement  or  because  there  is  no  reasonable 
prospect that an agreement will be reached at all.  Put differently, the debt counsellor 
may only refer a case of attempted voluntary r e-arrangement to the  Court should 
he/she  be  satisfied  that  negotiations  have  been  concluded  or  are  making  no 
headway.
77    The  Court  could  therefore  not make  an order as prayed  for  by the 
applicant. 
 
The Court also referred to  Section 86(10) in terms of which   credit providers can 
terminate a debt review  at any time at least  sixty business days after the time  at 
which the consumer applied for the debt review .   Credit providers may delay the 
negotiation process with a view to exercising their rights under  Section  86(10).  
Should a debt counsellor conclude that a credit provider is not negotiating in good 
faith, he/she may also conclude that negotiations  are making no headway.   Debt 
counsellors should however be careful before reaching such a conclusion.  They are 
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advised  to  inform  the  relevant  credit  provider  that  the  debt  counsellor  is  of  the 
opinion that the former is not negotiating in good faith and that the matter will be 
referred  to  court.
78  Hasty and unreasonable conclusions on the part of the debt 
counsellor may result in adverse costs orders. 
 
As regards the counter-application, the Court also deemed it unwise to issue such an 
order.   It attempts to define circumstances under which it could be said that no 
agreement has been reached .   As that will depend on  the facts of each case, a 
definition should not be attempted, according to the Court.
79 As regards Prayer 14, 
the application and counter-application were therefore both refused. 
 
It is regrettable that no order was made in this instance.  Although the Court shows 
sympathy  for  the  debt  counsellor's  dilemma,  there  is  still  a  serious  problem  in 
practice.  Some credit providers do not react either timeously or at all to proposals 
for restructuring.  The tendency amongst debt counsellors is therefore to approach 
the Court directly without even trying to negotiate in case in which a Section 86(7)(c) 
finding has been made,
80 as they fear termination by the credit providers in terms of 
Section 86(10).  Although the applicant's Prayer 14 states the obvious and does not 
address  the  real  issue  with  regard  to  Section  86(7)(c),  it  is  submitted  that  an 
extended order in this regard would have given more clarity.   I therefore agree with 
Roestoff et al
81 that an amendment to Section 86(8) should include references to 
both Sections 86(7)(b) and 86 (7)(c) to provide for a possible consent order. 
 
2.2.3   The rules with regard to costs 
 
In Prayer 5 of its notice of motion,
82 the Regulator sought an order declaring that the 
Rules of Court relating to costs and principles  that generally apply to the award of 
costs in applications do not apply to hearings conducted in terms of Section 87 of the 
NCA.   In particular the general rule  is challenged  that costs should follow t he 
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applicant,  should  the  debt  counsellor's  recommendation  be  rejected  by  a 
Magistrate's Court. 
 
A proper interpretation of Section 86 of the NCA and with regard to the distinction 
between a "referral of a recommendation" as opposed to "an application to Court", 
persuaded the applicant that there was no justification for rendering the full Rule 33 
of  the  Magistrate’s  Courts  Rules  applicable  to  a  debt  counsellor.
83   Were a debt 
counsellor to attract an adverse costs order because of his/her recommendation to a 
magistrate,  debt  counsellors  may  then  become  very  reluctant  to  ma ke  any 
recommendations to a magistrate.   A debt counsellor has no personal interest in 
his/her referral or recommendation and it would be unfair in these circumstances to 
punish the debt counsellor for the role he/she plays under the NCA .
84 In addition, 
since an express provision in the NCA  that empowers a magistrate to award costs 
against a debt counsellor or the debtor is absent,  the applicant  submitted that a 
magistrate has no power to do this.
85 
 
The Court pointed out that a debt counsellor who refers an  application to the Court 
under  Sections  86(8)(b) and 86(7)(c) is not a litigant in the ordinary sense.    By 
referring a matter to the  Court and by making a recommendation,  he/she fulfils a 
statutory  obligation.
86  A  functionary  in  the  process  of  fulfilling  his/her  statutory 
function during court proceedings is not ordinarily ordered to pay the costs of any 
other party.  Adverse costs orders against such functionaries are  usually only made 
if  the  functionary  acted  improperly  or  mala  fide.
87  The  practical  difficulties  that 
prompted the applicant to seek the order under consideration probably resulted from 
a failure to apply this salutary principle.  Consequently, the Court made Order 5 in 
accordance with the counter-application of the first to sixth respondents,
88 but added 
some introductory words in Order 6:  
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Bearing in mind that the debt counsellor fulfils a statutory obligation, Rule 33 
of the Magistrate's Courts' Rules is applicable to applications under section 
86 and 87 of the National Credit Act, 2005.  [my italics] 
 
In  my  view,  the  above  approach  is  correct.    Since  the  debt  counsellor  is  an 
intermediary and not a party to the suit, he/she should be protected from unfair cost 
orders.  The Court compromised effectively between the Rules of the Magistrate's 
Courts and the spirit of the NCA. 
 
Roestoff et al
89 pointed out an initial concern after the commencement of the NCA, 
namely  that  the  fees  for  debt  counselling  were  so  dismal  that  no  one  would  be 
interested in practising as a debt counsellor.  It has since been suggested by Du 
Plessis
90 that credit providers should also bear some of the costs involved, since the 
restructuring of debt repayments would enable them to recover claims. 
  
2.2.4.  Remarks 
 
The orders made under the current prayer heading are important.  It is submitted that 
the approach of the Court is correct.  The debt counsellor as applicant differs from 
the normal applicant in terms of Rule 55.  He/she is even protected against some 
cost orders because of a statutory function.  Because of this special function, the 
following question arises:  should this difference in treatment not be even greater 
than  custom  presently  permits  or  proposes?    Since  this  function  brings  great 
responsibility  and  much  paper  work,  should  it  not  affect  the  fees  that  a  debt 
counsellor may charge?  
 
2.3  Procedures of the court application  
 
The last group of prayers concerns the arena of the Court.  The orders granted in 
this regard affect the "business" of a debt counsellor directly.  It is submitted that 
these orders have brought clarity with regard to some difficult issues.  
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2.3.1   Service of court documents 
 
In Prayer 6 of its notice of motion,
91 the Regulator requested an order that service of 
any recommendation or other documents contemplated in Sections 86 or 87 of the 
NCA may, with the agreement of the affected parties, be done by way of fax or e -
mail.  In support of this prayer,
92 the Regulator has pointed out that a speedy and 
easily verifiable method of providing notice would be ideal, such as by fax or e -mail.  
It would be time-consuming and expensive were notices to be served by the deputy 
sheriff on each credit provider.  Were service to be effected by the deputy sheriff in 
accordance with the MCA and its Rules, few consumers would be able to a fford an 
application  for debt  restructuring by the court.   Scholtz  et  al 
93  argue  that  the 
domicilium address given by the debtor in the credit agreement should rather be 
used for the address of service. 
 
A counter-application by the first to sixth respondents suggested that Rule 9 of the 
Magistrate’s Courts' Rules should be applicable to the service of documents for the 
purpose of the reference and the hearing contemplated in Sections 86(8)(b) and 87 
of the NCA.
94  This proposition was accepted and accordingly the Court incorporated 
it into Order 7 to provide more clarity on the options of service:
95 
 
Rule 9 of the Magistrate's Courts' Rules pertaining to service are applicable 
to the service of process, any recommendation and other documents for the 
purpose  of  the  referral  and  hea ring  contemplated  in  sections  86(7)(c), 
86(8)(b) and 87 of the National Credit Act, 2005, but service of any such 
documents may, with the agreement of the affected parties, be by way of fax 
or email.  
 
Haupt, Roestoff and Erasmus  propose a new  Regulation 26(4) with regard to the 
issue of notification:
96 
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Notification to the relevant credit providers of an application by the consumer 
in terms of section 86(8)(b) and 86(9) may be effected by one or more of the 
following mechanisms: 
(a)  personal delivery; 
(b)  registered mail to the last known address of the relevant credit 
provider; 
(c)  fax or email, provided that the debt counsellor is able to provide 
satisfactory proof of successful transmission of such fax or email 
or an acknowledgement of receipt be obtained from the relevant 
credit provider. 
 
Order  7  implies  that  an  arrangement  in  respect  of  service  by  e-mail  or  fax  be 
negotiated between the parties for each separate occurrence.  It is submitted that a 
standard agreement that could apply to every document that the parties deal with at 
present  or  in  future  could  reduce  cost  and  time.    This  internal  and  ongoing 
arrangement is possibly not outside the boundaries of the Declarator's obiter dicta,
97 
although the order does not explicitly commend it.   
 
A proposed amendment to the Magistrate’s Courts Rules providing for the serving of 
the application by registered post, where the creditors have not consented to service 
by fax or e-mail, is envisaged by Loots.
98 
 
2.3.2  Jurisdiction 
 
In Prayer 8 of its notice of motion,
99 the Regulator sought an order declaring that any 
Magistrate's Court that a debt counsellor elects to refer a recommendation to, has 
jurisdiction to conduct such hearing.  The applicant argued that Section 86(8)(b) of 
the NCA places no limitation upon a debt counsellor regarding the choice of court to 
which he/she must refer his/her recommendation.
100  It follows that the court to which 
a debt counsellor refers his/her recommendation is also the court  that should hear 
the matter and that has jurisdiction to do so. 
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The  Court  pointed  out  that  the  relief  the  applicant  sought  was  based  on  the 
contention that the MCA did not apply to the procedure under consideration.  The 
Court already found differently in Orders 3 and 4.
101  It was held in that the Court 
said that the question of jurisdiction must be decided with reference to the  MCA.  
The general rule regarding jurisdiction is  actor sequitur forum rei.  The plaintiff (or 
applicant)  ascertains  where  the  defendant  (respondent)  resides,  goes  to  his/her 
forum, and serves him/her with the summons or notice of motion there.
102 Therefore, 
an  applicant  must  bring  his/her  application  in  the  Magistrate 's  Court  that  has 
jurisdiction in respect of the person of the respondent.
103  Under the debt review 
proceedings of  Sections  86(7)(c), 86(8)(b) and 87 ,  the Court held that the  debt 
counsellor who refers the matter to the Magistrate's Court is the applicant.
104 The 
consumer and his/her credit providers are the respondents.  
 
The applicant pointed out that one Magistrate's Court will not often have jurisdiction 
in respect of the person of all the respondents .  In order to address the problem of 
multiple respondents and to give effect to the express purpose of the Act in respect 
of debt review procedures, the  Court held that the  term "the Magistrate's Court" in 
sections 86(7)(c), 86(8)(b) and 87 of the Act must be interpreted to mean  "the 
Magistrate's Court having jurisdiction in respect of the person of the consumer [my 
italics]".
105 
 
This order is surprising and somewhat revolutionary.  The consumer now becomes 
the first respondent and therefore his person founds the jurisdiction.  The address of 
his residence or workplace can be used to cite the respondent and set the motion 
procedure under way.   
 
In my opinion, Section 86(8) should be amended, in order to address any uncertainty 
pertaining  to  the  issue  of  geographic  jurisdiction.
106    It is proposed that the debt 
counsellor apply to the Magistrate 's Court of the district in which the consumer 
resides or carries on business or is employed, or should the consumer consent, that 
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the application be directed to the Magistrate's Court of the district in which the debt 
counsellor's business is situated.  The argument for the second option is that the 
whole cause of action as regards the debt review process originates from the district 
in which the debt counsellor's business is situated.
107 
 
It should be noted that the Draft Regulations already defined "court" as a magistrate 
court established in terms of the MCA, "having jurisdiction over a consumer by virtue 
of such consumer's residence  or  place  of  business  or  the  residence  or  place  of 
business  of  a  debt  counsellor,  irrespective  of  the  monetary  value  involved  [my 
italics]".
108  In this regard, it is proposed that this definition for "Magistrate's Court" be 
added to Section 78 of the Act to provide for this alternative.
109  If not, the part that 
reads "or the residence or place of business of the debt counsellor" must be deleted.  
 
Another amendment of Section 86(8) is in my opinion needed  to make it clear that 
the debt counsellor is the only applicant in all court proceedings under  Sections 86 
and 87, while the consumer is the first respondent.
110 
 
2.3.3  Monetary limit 
 
In Prayer 9 of its notice of motion,
111 the Regulator sought a declaratory order that 
there be no monetary limit upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrate 's Courts to hear a 
referral under Section 87 of the NCA.  The Court pointed out that the NCA places no 
monetary limit upon the jurisdiction of a Magistrate 's Court to hear a referral .  The 
Act  provides  that  matters be  referred  to  the  Magistrate 's  Court,  but  makes  no 
mention of a monetary limit to the jurisdiction of that Court.  In the circumstances, the 
Court held that there is no basis to hold that there is a monetary limit to the relevant 
jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court.  To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of 
the Act.
112 Order 9 therefore provided as follows: 
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There is no monetary limit upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts to 
hear a referral under s 87 of the National Credit Act, 2005.  
 
An additional subsection to Section 78 that states clearly that there is no monetary 
limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court with regard to debt review 
matters is suggested as the Draft Regulations in its definition of "court" has provided 
for already in Section 1.
113 
 
2.3.4  In duplum rule  
 
In Prayer 10 of its notice of motion,
114 the Regulator sought a declaratory order that: 
 
on a proper interpretation of section 103(5), read with section 101(1)(b)  to 
(g) of the NCA: 
  the  amounts  contemplated  in  sections  101(1)(b)  to  (g)  which 
accrue  while  the  consumer  is  in  default  may  not  exceed,  in 
aggregate, the unpaid balance of the principal debt when the 
default occurred; 
  once the total charges referred to in sections 101(1)(b) to (g)  
equal the amount of the unpaid balance at the time of default, no 
further charges may be levied; 
  once the total charges referred to in sections 101(1)(b) to (g) 
equal the amount of the unpaid balance, payments made by a 
consumer thereafter during a period  of default do not have the 
effect of permitting the credit provider to charge further interest 
while such default persists. 
 
The amounts referred to in Sections 101(1)(b) to (g) relate to initiation fees, service 
fees, interest, cost of insurance, default administration charges and collection costs.  
The applicant's interpretation is that once the total charges under Sections 101(1)(b) 
to (g) – which include interest – equal the amount of the unpaid balance, no further 
charges (again, including interest) may be levied.
115 
 
Section 103(5) describes the moment at which the unpaid balance of the principal 
debt must be fixed as  "the time that  [the consumer's] default occurs".  Clearly, it 
provides that the prohibition against the accrual of amounts, in aggregate, exceeding 
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that unpaid balance holds "during the time that a consumer is in default under the 
credit  agreement".    A  consumer  remains  in  default  until  his  payments  under  the 
credit agreement are brought up to date.
116  What the words "up to date" entail is 
uncertain. 
 
The first to sixth respondents argue d that the Regulator's interpretation of  Section 
103(5) would result in hardship for credit providers.   However, were all the interest, 
fees and charges contemplated under  Section  101(1) of the NCA  to  commence 
running  up  again  as  soon  as  there  is  a  purging  of  the  default,  especially  by 
complying with a debt rearrangement order, many debtors  would be unable to pay 
off their debts and the object of the section  would be frustrated.
117  The introductory 
words to Section 103(5) make it clear that the legislature intended to depart from the 
common law in duplum rule.  This departure is deliberate and there is no need for re-
importing  it  into  the  fabric  of  the  section  under  the  guise  of  equitable 
considerations.
118 
 
All the respondents, other than the twelfth respondent, argued that  Section 103(5) 
operates similar to the common law rule of in duplum.  They contended that if section 
103(5) is interpreted in agreement with the common law, the effect of Section 103(5) 
is  only  to  create  a  moratorium  on  the  payment  of  the  cost  of  credit,  while  the 
consumer  is  in  default,  but  it  does  not  affect  the  underlying  obligation  to  make 
payment.    Once  he/she  purges  the  default,  all  the  cost  of  credit  may  be  levied 
again.
119  In contrast, hereto Scholtz et al 
120 state that the common law rule "has 
now been codified and extended by the National Credit Act to provide consumers 
with even better protection".  
 
The Court held that this viewpoint is contrary to the clear wording of Section 103(5).  
This subsection applies despite "any provision of the common law", which includes 
the in duplum rule.  Furthermore, the amounts "that accrue" during the default "may 
not, in aggregate, exceed the unpaid balance".  During the period of default, no more 
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than  the  stated  maximum  can  accrue.    Hence,  the  consumer's  indebtedness  in 
respect  of  the  cost  of  credit  cannot  grow  by  more  than  the  stated  maximum.  
Therefore, the Court granted an Order 11 in terms of the applicant's prayer. 
 
It is submitted that the Court's approach is correct.  The order brings some clarity 
with respect to the interpretation of the statutory in duplum rule.  The respondents 
attempted to revive the common law in their interpretation of Section 103(5).  The 
Court rejected this and placed a cap on the total amount per agreement that can be 
owed,  namely  twice  the  principal  debt.    Unfortunately,  the  exact  meaning  of  the 
phrase "during the time that the consumer is under default" is still not clear.  The 
starting point of default is possibly the moment at which the consumer fails to pay his 
agreed instalment.  The time at which this period ends is unclear.  Is it the moment at 
which the down payments eventually cause the amount still owed to be equal to the 
original amount owed when the default began?  And if so, can the costs in terms of 
Section 101(1) run up again to the amount capped by the in duplum rule, if he/she 
defaults hereafter? 
 
Meiring
121 submits that a consumer remains in default until his payments under the 
credit agreements are brought up to date, and that such a default is not purged by 
the making of part payments or at the point at which the creditor initiates litigation.  
Some debt counsellors are of the  view that as regards a specific credit agreement 
the total maximum debt to be repaid can never be more than double the amount of 
the debt at the moment of  default.
122  However, the first and third respondent filed 
notices for leave to appeal to challenge Order 11 granted by the Court.
123     
 
The judgment of the Court in this regard also affects the term of debt review and a 
possible discharge of the consumer later on.  It seems that a spiral of ever-escalating 
running costs can no longer hold the consumer ransom for the rest of his/her life.  If 
the amount is capped at double the principal debt amount at default and does not 
repeatedly run up to the capped amount, it will then be possible for the consumer to 
pay his/her debt off in time, hopefully in not more than a few years.   
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2.3.5  Reckless credit 
 
The  Court  accepted  the  first  to  sixth  respondents'  counter-proposal
124  to  the 
Regulator's Prayer 11
125 with a slight correction:
126 
 
Where a debt counsellor refers a recommendation to a Magistrate's Court 
that  it find  that  a  credit  agreement  is reckless,  or a  consumer makes an 
application to such court in terms of section 86(9) of the National Credit Act, 
2005, and the court finds that the credit agreement concerned is reckless  
(a)  upon  the  grounds  that  the  credit  provider  has  not  complied  with 
sections  80(1)(a)  and  80(1)(b)(i),  the  Court  may  make  the  orders 
contemplated in section 83(2); 
(b)  upon  the  grounds  that  the  credit  provider  has  not  complied  with 
80(1)(b)(ii), and the consumer is found to be over-indebted at the time 
of those court proceedings, the Court may make the orders referred to 
in sections 83(3)(b)(i) and (ii).   
 
Order 10 sought no more than to paraphrase the relevant powers that the Act gave 
to the Magistrate's Court.  Although the impact of this order is not dramatic, it may 
still  clear  some  confusion.    Structuring  the  types  of  reckless  lending  and  the 
consequences thereof may assist debt counsellors, credit providers and courts to 
see the bigger picture with regard to reckless credit extension by the NCA. 
 
When drafting a referral or recommendation to the Court, a debt counsellor will be 
well  advised  to  pray  prominently  for  a  declaration  of  over-indebtedness  and,  if 
applicable, that one or more of the credit agreements be declared reckless.  The kind 
of reckless credit extension should be pointed out, as well as a recommendation as 
to the finding of the Court in terms of Section 83. 
 
2.3.6  Emoluments attachment orders 
 
In  Prayer  12  of  its  notice  of  motion,
127  the Regulator seeks a declarator that a 
Magistrate's Court making an order in terms of Section 87 may also issue an order of 
the nature contemplated in  Rule 65(J) of the Rules under the  MCA, attaching the 
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emoluments of the consumer and obliging him or her to make periodic payments to 
the credit provider.
128  The Regulator, appreciating the merit of an order of the nature 
contemplated in Rule 65(J), envisages a magistrate to be able to, with the consent of 
the consumer, grant an order similar to that envisaged by Rule 65(J).  This prayer is 
sought since some magistrates found that they are not entitled to grant such orders, 
even when credit providers consented thereto.
129 
 
The Court pointed out that the powers of the Magistrate's Court upon a referral were 
to be found in the Act.  There is no provision in the NCA for the making of an order in 
terms of Section 65J of the MCA that deals with the emoluments attachment order.  
The order sought was accordingly refused by the Court.
130 
 
It is submitted that the  Court's viewpoint in this regard is correct .    However,  the 
current situation is not ideal .   In practice, it is important that a consolidated  debt-
repayment amount be paid over regularly to a  payment distribution agency  in one 
transaction.  This can very effectively be arranged by means of an order against the 
consumer's salary and could form part of the recommendation before court  to be 
decided  in  terms  of  Section  87(1).    Haupt ,  Roestoff  and  Erasmus  propose 
amendments to Section 87(1) to provide the Magistrate's Court with  the powers to 
grant orders in this regard:
131 
 
87.  (1)  (v)  an emoluments attachment order authorising the attachment 
in  the  prescribed  manner  of  emoluments  at  present  or  in 
future  owing  or  accruing  to  the  consumer  from  the 
consumer's  employer  by  the  payment  distribution  agent 
contemplated in subparagraph (iv). 
(vi)  an  order  suspending,  amending  or  rescinding  any  pre-
existing emoluments attachment order issued in respect of a 
judgment that was obtained after the relevant credit provider 
has taken steps to enforce a credit agreement. 
 
A  new  subsection  (vi)  empowers  the  Magistrate's  Court  to  suspend,  amend  or 
rescind any pre-existing emoluments attachment orders.
132  The aim is to give the 
                                                 
128  Heads para 119. 
129  Heads para 122. 
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magistrate  the  discretion  to  suspend,  amend  or  rescind  emoluments  attachment 
orders, should good cause be shown by the debt counsellor, for example in cases in 
which excessive interest rates are applicable.
133 A creditor who is already gaining 
from an existing emoluments attachment order will  have the opportunity in  court to 
oppose any rescission of this order or be joined to all the other creditors.   Allowing 
the Magistrate's Court the power to grant an emoluments attachment order would, in 
my view, simplify and facilitate the  debt-repayment process.  Furthermore, the new 
proposed subsection (vi) could also ensure fair treatment of all credit providers. 
 
2.3.7  Sections 86(2) and 129(1) of the NCA 
 
In Prayer 13 of its notice of motion,
134 the Regulator seeks a declaratory order that 
the reference in Section 86(2) to the taking of steps refer only to the commencement 
of legal proceedings mentioned in Section 129(1)(b) and not include steps taken in 
terms of Section 129(1)(a) of the NCA.  None of the respondents opposed the relief 
sought by the Regulator in this prayer.
135 
 
In terms of Section 86(2), an application in terms of Section 86(1) "may not be made 
in respect of, and does not apply to, a particular credit agreement if, at the time of 
that application, the credit provider under that credit agreement has proceeded  to 
take  the  steps  contemplated  in  section  129  to enforce  that agreement".   Section 
129(1) prescribes  certain  steps  that  a  credit  provider  must  take  before  a  debt  is 
enforced:  
 
If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider– 
(a)  may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and 
propose that the consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt 
counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or 
ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that the parties resolve any 
dispute under the agreement or develop and agree on a plan to 
bring the payments under the agreement up to date; and  
(b)  subject  to  section  130(2),  may  not  commence  any  legal 
proceedings to enforce the agreement before– 
(i)  first  providing  notice  to  the  consumer,  as  contemplated  in 
paragraph (a) or in section 86(10), as the case may be; and  
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(ii)  meeting any further requirements set out in section 130. 
 
All  the  parties  before  court  agreed  that  this  order  must  be  made.
136  The  Court 
pointed out that the  purpose of  Section 86(2) is to ensure that consumers do not 
apply to be declared over-indebted only to frustrate a credit provider who has already 
started to enforce a credit agreement under which the consumer is in default.   While 
Section 129(1)(a)  envisages  alternative  dispute  resolution  and  "a  plan  to  bring 
payments under the agreement up to date ", it does not envisage general debt 
restructuring under Sections 86 and 87.
137  The steps set out in  Section 129(1)(a) 
are preliminary to debt enforcement.   According to Scholtz  et al,
138 the legislature 
"intended the debt review process to be available to a consumer as long as the credit 
provider does not serve a summons on him".   
 
"In the absence of full argument, and in view thereof that there were many other 
persons with an interest in this order", the judge deemed it unwise to say more than 
the  above  and  did  not  grant  the  order.
139  This  decision  is  regrettable,  since 
confusion  remains as  regards  the moment  at  which   enforcement  begins.    Van 
Loggerenberg,  Dicker  and  Malan
140  submitted  that  enforcement  of  a  credit 
agreement commences upon the issuing and service of a summons, after the credit 
provider has complied with the requirements set out in  Section 129(1), read with 
Section 130(1) of the Act. A Section 129(1)(a) notice delivered to a consumer by a 
credit  provider  does  not  constitute  enforcement,  as  the  heading  to  Section  129 
explicitly  refers  to  "Required  procedures  before  debt  enforcement".
141  The 
legislator's reference to  Section 129 in  Section 86(2) is rather a reference to the 
commencement  of  legal  proceedings  mentioned  in  Section  129(1)(b),  and  a 
consumer should not be precluded from applying f or debt review in respect of the 
specific credit agreement after receipt of a Section 129(1)(a) notice.
142  
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According to Van Loggerenberg, Dicker and Malan,
143 it does not make sense to 
propose that the consumer should approach a debt counsellor and at the same time 
preclude the consumer from applying for debt review.   The interpretation that the 
Court attributes to  Section 86(2) leads to an absurd result.   In order to clarify the 
uncertainty regarding the moment at which enforcement for the purposes of Section 
86(2) commences, it is proposed that  Section  86(2) be amended by substituting 
"Section 129" with "Section 130".
144 
 
According to Monty,
145 the question still remains as to what constitutes "steps taken 
to enforce the credit agreement in terms of section 129" for the purpose of excluding 
certain credit agreements in terms of section 86(2) from debt review.  Although this is 
still unclear, Otto
146 warns consumers not to ignore a notice under Section 129(1)(a), 
but rather to seek the advice of a debt counsellor ti meously and definitely within the 
ten days after a Section 129 notice has been received. 
 
2.3.8   Remarks 
 
Debt counsellors should welcome most orders in this section, namely those that deal 
with the service of documents, the geographical jurisdiction and monetary limit of the 
court, and the in duplum rule.  However, the Court exercised caution with respect to 
emoluments attachments orders and the application of Section 86(2).  The lack of 
direction regarding whether formal debt enforcement starts with Sections 129(a) or 
(b), in particular, is regrettable.  This could hopefully be resolved by amending the 
statute.  
 
3  Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that the declaratory order has a definite impact on debt counselling 
practice in South Africa. 
 
The  interaction  between  the  NCA  and  the  MCA  has  been  defined  more  clearly.   
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Although  the  procedures  that  have  to  be  followed  were  not  what  some  debt 
counsellors had hoped for, the declaratory order did indeed bring clarity regarding 
many  aspects.    The  role  of  the  debt  counsellor  in  court,  as  well  as  the  more 
sympathetic  treatment  that  he/she  will  receive  in  some  instances,  is  illuminating.  
The  orders  dealing  with  the  service  of  documents,  geographical  and  monetary 
jurisdiction, and the in duplum rule are to be lauded. 
 
However, the impact of the Declarator was not as great as was expected.  In some 
instances, the Court did not go far enough, for example acknowledging an additional 
jurisdiction for cause of action, utilising the emoluments attachment order better and 
restricting  the  application  of  Section  86(2)  to  Section  129(b).    There  are  also 
inconsistencies between the Declarator and the Draft Regulations, which the Court 
possibly did not take into consideration or preferred not to remark upon. 
 
The Declarator is certainly a milestone in the history of the NCA.  The orders have 
influenced the practice of debt review widely, and will continue to shape the credit 
industry.  It is now for the industry, the NCR, legislators and scholars to take matters 
further. 
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